

















INSULATING THE CONSTITUTION: YONG VUI KONG V
PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [2010] SGCA 20
ARAVIND GANESH*
A INTRODUCTION
On 14 May 2010, Chan Sek Keong CJ, sitting with Andrew Phang and VK Rajah
JJA, delivered the unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal of Singapore (the
Court) in Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor.1 The defendant had been sentenced to
death by hanging after being convicted of an offence contrary to the Misuse of
Drugs Act 19732 (MDA) by trafficking 47.27 grams of diamorphine into the
country. Section 33, read in conjunction with Schedule 2 of the MDA, imposes the
mandatory death sentence on persons convicted of trafficking more than 15 grams
of diamorphine. The defendant appealed against his sentence on the grounds that
the mandatory death penalty was an unconstitutional violation of the right to life
and of the right to equal protection provided under arts 9(1) and 12(1) respectively
of the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. The central argument of this
comment is that the judgment of the Court is an attempt to insulate the
Constitution against external elements: it shields Singaporean constitutional law,
firstly from developments occurring in customary international law, and secondly
from its colonial history.
The constitutionality of the mandatory death penalty had been considered by
the highest courts in Singapore on previous occasions—by the Privy Council in
Ong Ah Chuan v Public Prosecutor3 and, after appeal to the Board was abolished in
1994, by the Court of Appeal in Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor.4 Despite Nguyen
having been heard recently in 2004, the Court gave leave to pursue the appeal on
grounds that the defendant had ‘new arguments based on new materials’ to show
that both Ong and Nguyen were wrongly decided.5 This note will not discuss the 
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1 [2010] SGCA 20 (Yong).
2 Cap 185 (2008 Rev Ed).
3 [1981] AC 648 (Privy Council (PC)) (Ong).
4 [2004] SGCA 47 (Nguyen).
5 Yong (n 1) [5]. See Yong Vui Kong v Public Prosecutor [2009] SGCA 64 where the Court of Appeal held
that it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal on the merits.
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art 12(1) equal protection issue,6 nor will it discuss whether or not the mandatory
death penalty is actually cruel, or inhuman and degrading, or otherwise illegal.
Instead, it will concentrate on the word ‘law’ in art 9(1), which provides that: ‘No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in accordance with
law.’7 It had been submitted by the appellant, firstly, that the mandatory death
penalty was a deprivation of life not ‘in accordance with law’ because it was
contrary to customary international law, which must be included under ‘law’ for
the purposes of art 9(1).8 Secondly, he argued that the mandatory death penalty
was unconstitutional because the word ‘law’ in art 9(1) must be read to preclude
cruel or inhuman punishments.9
B ON CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW
The appellant’s argument was of considerable subtlety—he maintained that the
word ‘law’ in art 9(1) included customary international law, such that norms of
international law were incorporated into the right to life, which could then
invalidate acts of Parliament. The Court noted that the appellant raised no
authority for this proposition,10 which, in the Court’s opinion, would have turned
Singapore into a monist legal system where international legal norms trumped
domestic statutes. In the subsequent paragraph entitled ‘The Prosecution’s
response’, the Court related how the prosecution, represented by Attorney-
General Walter Woon SC, after being pressed for a clear response, agreed with
the appellant that the expression ‘law’ should, in principle, be interpreted to
include customary international law. In the same paragraph, the Court continued:
We [the Court] do not think that the AG, by this reply, was conceding that the expression
‘law’ includes CIL [customary international law] in the sense that ‘law’ has been defined
to include CIL, with the consequence that, once it is shown that there is a rule of CIL
prohibiting the MDP [mandatory death penalty] as an inhuman punishment, that CIL
rule automatically becomes part of ‘law’ for the purposes of Art 9(1). Indeed, the
constitutional definition of ‘law’ in Art 2(1) is quite different . . . Besides, such a concession
would be contrary to the decision in Nguyen . . . where this court held at [94], citing (inter
alia) the Privy Council case of Chung Chi Cheung v The King [1939] AC 160 . . . that in the
event of a conflict between a rule of CIL and a domestic statute, the latter would prevail.
From his other submissions, it seems clear enough to us that what the AG meant when
he said that the expression ‘law’ should be interpreted to include CIL was that this
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6 Yong (n 1) [111]–119].
7 Art 2(1) defines the term ‘law’ as ‘includ[ing] written law and any legislation of the United Kingdom
or other enactment or instrument whatsoever which is in operation in Singapore and the common
law in so far as it is in operation in Singapore and any custom or usage having the force of law in
Singapore.’ The same article also defines the term ‘written law’ as ‘this Constitution and all Acts
and Ordinances and subsidiary legislation for the time being in force in Singapore.’
8 Yong (n 1) [33].
9 ibid (n 1) [33].
10 ibid (n 1) [43].
expression would include a CIL rule which had already been recognised and applied by
a domestic court as part of Singapore law.11
The court repeated this reasoning almost in its entirety later in the section setting
out its own determination of the issue.12 It is understood that the respondent’s
initial submissions on the question were unclear,13 but nevertheless, this judicial
‘channelling’ of the prosecution’s ‘real’ meaning must strike one as peculiar.
After reading Chung Chi Cheung v The King,14 the Court eventually held that ‘[i]n
our view, a rule of CIL is not self-executing in the sense that it cannot become part
of domestic law until and unless it has been applied or definitively declared to be
part of domestic law by a domestic court.’15 At first glance, this might strike one as
being hopelessly circular if it is read to mean ‘a Singaporean court cannot apply a
rule of customary international law unless and until a Singaporean court has
applied that rule of customary international law.’ This is probably not what the
Court meant. The Court specifically and correctly acknowledged a judicial duty
to interpret domestic law in conformity with international law: ‘We agree that
domestic law, including the Singapore Constitution, should, as far as possible, be
interpreted consistently with Singapore’s international legal obligations.’16 But
such conform-interpretation does not endow the specific rule of customary
international law with direct legal validity within the domestic legal sphere. For
that, an Act of Parliament must recognise it, or a court must ‘translate’ it into the
municipal legal order by declaring a new rule of common law. The Court then
cited Lord Atkin in Chung as authority for its position:17
[S]o far, at any rate, as the Courts of this country are concerned, international law has
no validity save in so far as its principles are accepted and adopted by our own domestic
law. There is no external power that imposes its rules upon our own code of substantive
law or procedure. The Courts acknowledge the existence of a body of rules which nations
accept amongst themselves.18
The above dicta would have disposed of the question, but things are never quite
as simple. Lord Atkin immediately goes on to say that ‘On any judicial issue they
seek to ascertain what the relevant rule is, and, having found it, they will treat it as
incorporated into the domestic law, so far as it is not inconsistent with rules enacted by statutes or
finally declared by their tribunals.’19




14 [1939] AC 160 (PC) (Chung).
15 Yong (n 1) [91].
16 ibid [59].
17 ibid [89].
18 Chung (n 14) 167–68. Yong also cites Collco Dealings Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1962] AC 1
(House of Lords (HL)); Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (7th edn, OUP 2008) 44;
Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, Volume 1: Peace (9th edn,
Longman 1992) 56; Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (7th edn,
Routledge 2007) 69.
19 Chung (n 14) 168 (emphasis added).
To be sure, the first passage asserts that customary international law is not law,
which is the opposite of what the Attorney-General (speaking for himself ) argued,
and is in line with the Court’s interpretation of his submissions, as well as its own
holding. However, as shall be explained shortly, the last excerpt appears to contain
something more than a requirement of conform-interpretation.
Conform-interpretation, properly understood, is the creative reading of a
domestic legal text to attain congruence with a non-domestic text, and ambiguities
in the domestic text are exploited for this purpose. The best-known illustrations of
this legal technique are to be found in the law of the European Union (EU)
pertaining to the indirect effect of EU Directives. In general, EU Directives are a
form of secondary legislation, which, if not translated into the legal orders of the
Member States by appropriate implementing measures, lack full direct effect.20
Although the Member State is estopped from relying on its failure to implement
the Directive,21 an unimplemented Directive may not be invoked by a private
individual against another private individual.22 To address this loophole, the ECJ
developed the doctrine of indirect effect in Von Colson,23 and in Marleasing,24 where
it held that:
in applying national law, whether the provisions in question were adopted before or after
the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is required to do so, as far as
possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive in order to achieve
the result pursued by the latter.25
It may be interposed that conform-interpretation in public international law differs
from the same under EU law, as the former places greater emphasis upon the
sovereignty of independent States, while the latter may be an incipient
constitutional order. For instance, a British judge interpreting domestic law in
conformity with a rule of public international law will be more reticent than if he
were interpreting to attain conformity with EU law, because of national sovereignty
concerns. While it is perhaps true that public international law and EU law derive
from qualitatively very different doctrines, it is difficult to discern any such
qualitative difference at the level of the specific legal techniques of conform-
interpretation. The difference between the two types of conform-interpretation is
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20 Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Ratti [1979] ECR 1629 [18]–[24] (European Court of Justice
(ECJ) ).
21 ibid [24]. See also Case 152/84 Marshall v Southampton Area Health Authority [1986] ECR 723. The
applicability of the unimplemented Directive against public bodies has come to be known as
‘vertical’ direct effect.
22 Duke v GEC Reliance [1987] UKHL 10. The facts of this case were substantially similar to those in
Marshall, except that whereas the employer in Marshall was a public employer, the employer in Duke
was a private corporation. The unimplemented Council Directive 76/207/EEC ([1976] OJ L039)
on equal treatment of the sexes was held to be applicable against the employer in the former, but
not in the latter.
23 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamann v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891 [26].
24 Case C–106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación SA [1990] ECR I–4135.
25 ibid [8].
purely one of degree, rather than kind. As long as the British judge mentioned above
has not yet reached the limit demanded by sovereignty, the process of conform-
interpretation of domestic legislation to, say, an international treaty, would be just
as teleological as if it were to an EU Directive. Of course, the limits upon the
potential for such creative reading differ: in conform-interpretation with EU law,
the limit is reached when the language of the domestic text cannot be strained any
further, whereas in conform-interpretation with public international law, the limit
is reached when national sovereignty is unacceptably curtailed. However, until this
limit is reached, the process of conform-interpretation is exactly the same in both
cases.
Lord Atkin appears to call for something quite different from conform-
interpretation by the use of the word ‘incorporation’. The rule in Chung points not
merely towards the resolution of ambiguities in favour of a rule of international law
in a specific case, but positively treats that rule as part of English law, unless and
until a domestic statute or judge-made rule un-incorporates it by clearly providing
otherwise. According to Chung, a rule of international law does not need to latch
onto any already existing domestic law rule for it to be ‘treated as incorporated’.
Yong, on the other hand, provides that a rule of customary international law is
unincorporated unless and until a statute or a judge clearly incorporates it. There is
indeed a jarring dissonance between the first line of paragraph 89 of Yong:
‘Ordinarily, in common law jurisdictions, CIL is incorporated into domestic law by
the courts as part of the common law in so far as it is not inconsistent with domestic
rules which have been enacted by statutes or finally declared by the courts’; and the
very next paragraph: ‘The principle enunciated . . . in Chung Chi Cheung entails that,
at common law, a CIL rule must first be accepted and adopted as part of our
domestic law before it is valid in Singapore’.26
The difficulty with the rule in Chung is that it is confused. It begins by instructing
that customary international law has no domestic legal validity, and ends with an
admonition to treat it as legally valid anyway. This is perhaps why it is capable of
being pressed into service on both sides of the argument: Lord Bingham’s speech in
R v Jones27 cites Chung as among other ‘old and high authority’ for the exact opposite
proposition that ‘[c]ustomary international law is (without the need for any
domestic statute or judicial decision) part of the domestic law of England and
Wales.’28 Perhaps the only way of making sense of this apparent contradiction is to
say that where customary rules of law are incorporated into the common law, such
incorporation is carried out by domestic judges, and not by virtue of international
law. Be that as it may, there must be some principle governing when and how judges
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26 Yong (n 1) [90].
27 [2006] UKHL 16.
28 ibid. The other authorities cited for the proposition were Triquet v Bath (1764) 3 Burr 1478, 1481; 96
ER 273; 4 Bl Comm 67; Duke of Brunswick v King of Hanover (1844) 6 Beav 1, 51–52; 49 ER 724;
Emperor of Austria v Day (1861) 2 Giff 628, 678; 66 ER 263; Trendtex Trading Corporation v Central Bank
of Nigeria [1977] QB 529, 554 (Court of Appeal (CA)); J H Rayner (Mincing Lane) Ltd v Department of
Trade and Industry [1989] Ch 72 207 (CA).
may incorporate customary international law, and Chung says such incorporation is
automatic, except where existing rules of statute and common law contradict.
Certainly, a rule denying any effect of customary international law within the
Singaporean municipal legal sphere would be plausible in the same way as the
decision of the Federal Court of Australia in Nulyarimma v Thompson.29 A credible
argument can be made that a democracy should not give direct effect to any rule
of international law, because all necessary democratic legislative procedures must
be followed before ordinary private relations can be controlled by a rule created
by the executive. It can be argued that the English common law ‘treated as
incorporated’ customary international law only because it was safely presumed
that in order for a body of State practice sufficiently ‘extensive and virtually
uniform’ to have come into being,30 Britain, possessing an empire covering most
of the globe, must have itself given rise or consented to it.31 The Republic of
Singapore, on the other hand, covering an area of 625 square kilometres and
fitting snugly inside the M25 ring road, cannot be so readily presumed to have
done the same. Nevertheless, such a judicial development would not be
uncontroversial. Singaporean constitutional scholars appear to have thought, until
now at least, that while the ‘Singaporean Constitution contains no express
provision regulating the reception of international law or establishing the
hierarchical ordering of international and domestic law’ the Singapore courts
‘generally [follow] UK practice on the domestic reception of international law.’32
The House of Lords in recent and empire-less times has held, in R v Bow Street
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3)33 and Jones34 respec -
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29 (1999) 96 FCR 153. The Court held that rules of customary international law prohibiting genocide
could not apply in Australia unless they had been incorporated by statute. See also Jones (n 27)
[23]–[29]: that whereas customary international civil law rules would be incorporated immediately
into UK law, such rules setting out international crimes could not. At no point does Nulyarimma state
that a judge may of his or her own volition incorporate a rule of customary international law into
domestic law.
30 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark; Federal Republic of Germany/
Netherlands) [1969] ICJ 3.
31 West Rand Central Gold Mining Co v R [1905] 2 KB 391, 406–07 (Lord Alverstone CJ):
It is quite true that whatever has received the common consent of civilized nations must have
received the assent of our country, and that to which we have assented along with other nations
in general may properly be called international law, and as such will be acknowledged and
applied by our municipal tribunals when legitimate occasion arises for those tribunals to decide
questions to which doctrines of international law may be relevant.
32 Li-ann Thio, ‘The Death Penalty as Cruel and Unusual Punishment Before the Singapore High
Court? Customary Human Rights Norms, Constitutional Formalism and the Supremacy of
Domestic Law in Public Prosecutor v Nguyen Van Tuong’ (2004) 4 Oxford University Commonwealth
Law Journal 1, 10–11. See also C L Lim, ‘The Constitution and the Reception of Customary
International Law: Nguyen Tuong Van v Public Prosecutor’ [2005] Singapore Journal of Legal
Studies 218, 228 citing Thio’s view as the ‘one thing’ commentators are agreed on.
33 [2000] 1 AC 147 (HL).
34 It must be observed that Lord Bingham in Jones (n 27) only accepted automatic domestic legal
validity of customary international law because it was not necessary to dispose of the question, and
actually expressed considerable reservation about the substance of the doctrine. At [11], Lord
tively, that rules of customary international law could narrow the application of
contrary legislation and common law, and that such rules formed part of the
domestic civil law of England and Wales. As such, the first criticism of the Court’s
holding on the reception of customary international law into the domestic legal
order is that it is insufficiently defended.
Another criticism might be that such a rule is imprudent, because of the
practical need to adapt to emerging norms as quickly as possible; ie, without
having to pass a statute which in any case cannot be applied retroactively. Instead,
it might be wiser to stay with Chung, and declare rules of customary international
law automatically part of domestic Singaporean law unless they contradict
statutes, constitutional rules, important and fundamental rules of common law,35
or strong public policy imperatives. In fact, one expects something of the kind to
be the real description of how the law will develop subsequent to this decision.
Consider a future civil litigation between two private parties coming before the
court, with one litigant invoking a widely-followed rule of customary international
law not yet translated into the domestic law by statute or previous judicial decision.
Failure to follow the new rule of customary law would disturb the expectations of
very many commercial actors. One imagines that a Singaporean judge would
most probably apply that rule. It would be a misuse of language to say that, when
she finds a rule where previously there was none, the judge is merely engaging in
conform-interpretation. Either we must say that the judge is making law (which
the Court rejects as illegitimate in other parts of the judgment36), or we must say
that customary international law has some legal validity in the domestic sphere. It
may be very low on the hierarchy of norms, being easily displaced by contrary
statutes or even rules of common law, but it nevertheless has some legal validity.
The above description of customary international law as sitting within a
hierarchy of norms would accordingly be a more accurate description of the status
of customary international law in Singapore, and would also have allowed the
Court to avoid a situation where rules of customary international law trump acts
of Parliament. The appellant arguably went too far by submitting that
international law could be ‘constitutionalised’ so as to trump domestic statutes. But
the Court conversely did nowhere near enough in terms of defending its
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Bingham states that there ‘seems to be truth in Brierley’s contention (“International Law in
England” (1935) 51 LQR 24, 31) . . . that international law is not a part, but is one of the sources,
of English Law.’
35 See Nulyarimma (n 29) [26] (Wilcox J): that at a minimum, rules of international law creating
international crimes could not translate directly into the domestic legal sphere because of the
fundamental constitutional rule of nullum crimen sine lege; approved in Jones (n 27) [23] (Lord
Bingham). See also Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (OUP 2007) 104–05: ‘Thus it may be
more accurate to say that incorporation can occur automatically only if it is of a type that can be
made justiciable in the national legal system and is of a kind where automatic implementation
would not offend a basic constitutional precept of that system.’
36 Yong (n 1) [72] (holding that the Court may not read a right against inhuman punishment into the
right to life in art 9(1)), and [113] (holding that courts may not question Parliament’s determination
of 15 grams as the threshold after which the mandatory imposition of the death penalty is merited).
reasoning. It is not sufficient for the Court to rest its entire reasoning on Chung—
that case simply does not mean what the Court thinks it does. Nevertheless, for the
moment at least, the Singaporean domestic legal order is insulated from
customary international law. However, the issues identified above give one reason
to suspect that we have yet to hear the final word on the reception of customary
international law within the Singaporean legal order.
C ON THE MEANING OF ‘LAW’: INHUMAN PUNISHMENT
The Court gave three reasons for rejecting the contention that rules establishing
inhuman punishments were not ‘law’ for the purposes of art 9(1). First, the
Constitution lacks an express provision prohibiting inhuman punishments in the
manner of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.37 There is
therefore no explicit textual authority for the Court to invalidate the mandatory
death penalty. Second, very early in its history, the Singaporean government
declined to adopt precisely such a constitutional provision, even though it had
been recommended by a commission headed by Wee Chong Jin CJ in 1966 (the
Wee Commission).38 The duty of deference owed to the legislature therefore
prevents Singaporean judges from reading into the right to life in art 9(1) a right
against inhuman punishment. The third plank of the Court’s reasoning concerned
the judgment in Mithu v State of Punjab,39 where the Indian Supreme Court held
that the Indian Constitution, which similarly lacks a clear textual prohibition
against inhuman punishments, nevertheless includes a prohibition in the right to
life enshrined in art 21 thereof, which was then invoked to find the mandatory
death penalty unconstitutional.
In essence, the Court rehearsed its argument in Nguyen, where it dismissed as
irrelevant the post-Ong Privy Council cases of Reyes v The Queen40 and Watson v The
Queen (A-G for Jamaica intervening),41 which held the mandatory death penalty
unconstitutional, on the grounds that the Board in those cases relied upon roughly
identical express constitutional prohibitions on inhuman or degrading punish -
ments: ie ss 7 and 17(1) of the Belize and Jamaican Constitutions respectively.42
This position, intellectually indefensible as it may ultimately be (for reasons that
will soon become clear43), has a veneer of plausibility because the Privy Council
also distinguished Ong on this basis in Bowe v The Queen,44 and for similar textual
reasons failed to find unconstitutional the mandatory death penalty in Boyce v The
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37 ibid [61].
38 ibid [62].
39 [1983] 2 SCR 690 (Mithu).
40 [2002] UKPC 11.
41 [2004] UKPC 34.
42 Nguyen (n 4) [84].
43 See text accompanying nn 68–73.
44 [2006] UKPC 10 [41].
Queen45 and Matthew v State of Trinidad and Tobago.46 Less understandable, however,
is the Court’s attempt to distinguish Reyes and Watson on the grounds that they
concerned mandatory death sentences for murder, rather than for trafficking.47
The real issue here was whether the right to life in art 9(1) could be interpreted to
include a prohibition on inhuman or cruel punishment.
That very question had been canvassed before the Privy Council in Ong, where
the prosecution had argued that art 9(1) sanctioned any deprivation of life and
liberty according to ‘any Act passed by the Parliament of Singapore, however
arbitrary or contrary to fundamental rules of natural justice’.48 Lord Diplock
rejected this submission, observing that:
In a Constitution founded on the Westminster model and particularly in that part of it
that purports to assure to all individual citizens the continued enjoyment of fundamental
liberties or rights, references to ‘law’ in such contexts as ‘in accordance with law,’
‘equality before the law,’ ‘protection of the law’ and the like, in their Lordships’ view,
refer to a system of law which incorporates those fundamental rules of natural justice that had
formed part and parcel of the common law of England that was in operation in Singapore at the
commencement of the [Singapore] Constitution. It would have been taken for granted by the makers
of the Constitution that the ‘law’ to which citizens could have recourse for the protection of fundamental
liberties assured to them by the Constitution would be a system of law that did not flout those fundamental
rules. If it were otherwise it would be [a] misuse of language to speak of law as something
which affords ‘protection’ for the individual in the enjoyment of his fundamental
liberties, and the purported entrenchment (by Article 5) of Articles 9(1) and 12(1) would
be little better than a mockery.49
Two international treaty provisions were raised in support of incorporating the
right against inhuman punishment into art 9(1): art 5 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR)50 and art 3 of the European Convention on Human
Rights (ECHR).51 The Court disposed of this argument by holding that although
Singaporean courts are under a duty to interpret Singaporean law consistently
with Singapore’s international legal obligations52 such as those arising under the
UDHR, such conform-interpretation could not avail where ‘the express wording
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45 [2004] UKPC 32 (Lord Bingham, Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Lord Steyn and Lord Walker of
Gestingthorpe dissenting).
46 [2004] UKPC 33.
47 Yong (n 1) [49].
48 Ong (n 3) 670.
49 ibid 670–71 (emphasis added).
50 Adopted 10 December 1948, United Nations General Assembly Res 217 A(III). Singapore is a party
to the UDHR, but not to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (opened for
signature 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976, 999 UNTS 171) (ICCPR), or 
to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (opened for signature 
16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976) (ICESCR), which render justiciable the
rights contained in the UDHR.
51 Opened for signature 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1950, ETS 5. Singapore
is not a party to the ECHR, but has been covered by it in the past. See text accompanying nn 56–57.
52 Yong (n 1) [59].
of the Singapore Constitution is not amenable . . . or where Singapore’s
constitutional history is such as to militate against the incorporation of those
international norms.’53 The Court then held that such incorporation into art 9(1)
was impossible, first, because ‘unlike the Constitutions of the Caribbean States, the
Singapore Constitution does not contain any express prohibition against inhuman
punishment’,54 and has a different constitutional history.55 The second reason was
the failure by the government to act on the recommendations of the Wee
Commission 1966 to amend the Constitution to include just such a provision.
1 Singaporean Constitutional History and the ECHR
The paragraphs of the judgment that discuss the history and formation of the
Singaporean Constitution are truly fascinating because they acknowledge, for the
first time in a judicial setting, the ‘little known legal fact that the ECHR was made
applicable to Singapore and the Federation of Malaya in 1953 just as it was made
applicable to Belize and several other British colonies by virtue of the UK’s
declaration under Art 63 of the ECHR.’56 As Lord Bingham noted in Reyes,57 the
later Belize and other Caribbean constitutions were modelled closely on the ECHR
to provide for prohibitions against inhuman punishments. On the other hand, in the
Court’s judgment, the Malayan Constitution of 1957, whose provisions on
fundamental rights Singapore eventually inherited upon independence from
Malaysia in 1965, were not modelled on the ECHR. The Court based this
determination solely on the fact that the Malayan Constitutional Commission
chaired by Lord Reid in 1957 omitted to recommend the incorporation of such a
provision in its report.58 Particularly conclusive in the Court’s eyes was the fact that
the report was published in 1957, four years after the ECHR had come into
existence,59 which meant, in its view, that the Reid Commission must have intended
to exclude a right against inhuman treatment or punishment.
With respect to the argument relating to the Wee Commission, the Court held
that:
The Government’s rejection of the proposed Art 13 [the right against inhuman
punishment recommended by the Wee Commission] was unambiguous, whatever the
reasons for such rejection were. This development, in our view, forecloses [the
appellant’s] argument that it is open to this court to interpret Art 9(1) . . . as incorporating
a prohibition against inhuman punishment . . . It is not legitimate for this court to read




56 ibid [61] referring to Karel Vasak, ‘The European Convention of Human Rights Beyond the
Frontiers of Europe’ (1963) 12 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 1206, 1210. Art 63
of the ECHR has since been renumbered to art 56.
57 Reyes (n 40) [28].
58 Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission (11 February 1957).
59 Yong (n 1) [62].
into Art 9(1) a constitutional right which was decisively rejected by the Government in
1969, especially given the historical context in which that right was rejected.60
The Court then recalled Lord Nicholls’ remarks in Matthew, that ‘[i]f departure
from fundamental rights is desired . . . The Constitution should be amended
explicitly’.61 The Court of Appeal then found that ‘[t]here is, in substance, no
difference between repealing an existing constitutional provision prohibiting
inhuman punishment and deliberately deciding not to enact such a constitutional
provision in the first place.’62 Accordingly, there is no constitutional protection
against greatly disproportionate punishments, or even against inhuman,
degrading or cruel treatment by the State, except possibly those measures that are
so objectionable that no rational legislator could have enacted them.
2 Cruelty, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment and the Common Law
Few things can be less controversial or more banal than the assertion that among
those ‘fundamental rules of natural justice that had formed part and parcel of the
common law of England’ is included a unique aversion to cruelty. With respect to
the pre-conviction stages of the common law criminal process, the late Lord
Bingham describes how, in the wake of the papal bull declaring trial by ordeal 
to be cruel, the English common law invented the mechanism of the jury to
determine factual matters, while the continent preferred the use of torture to
obtain confessions.63 Blackstone was famously proud of the refusal of the English
judiciary to torture the assassin of the Duke of Buckingham, and of the traditional
refusal to execute idiots and lunatics because:
The execution of the offender is for example, ut poena ad paucos, metus ad omnes perveniat [that
few may be punished, and that a fear of punishment may operate on all]; but so it is not
when a madman is executed; but should be a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of
extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and be not an example to others.64
One might pause at this point, and say that this is a highly selective and
sentimental whitewashing of English legal history which conveniently omits
mention of such practices as pressing to death those who refused consent to trial
by jury.65 Indeed, as both the Court of Appeal in Yong and the Privy Council in
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60 ibid [72].
61 Matthew (n 46) [74].
62 Yong (n 1) [74].
63 Reliance on torture became necessary because of the Roman law’s requirement of either a
confession or the corroborating testimony of two witnesses in order to secure a conviction. Witnesses
were difficult to find, and defendants reluctant to confess of their own accord, so torture was carried
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Ong observe, mandatory sentencing was the norm when it came to the death
penalty for most of the life of the common law.66
In addition, whatever may be said about the methods and process of execution,
it may be argued that the English law was particularly bloodthirsty in terms of 
the alacrity with which it imposed the death penalty for countless offences. The
problem with these scattered objections is that they merely point out instances of
specific rules of law. Lord Diplock’s dicta do not speak of specific rules, but of ‘a
system of law’ seen as a whole. Courts often deal with rules of law, many of which
have existed for centuries, which on examination are found to be entirely
incompatible with the general ‘system of law’. Many American States had long-
standing laws which outlawed contraception, abortion, homosexuality, and
suicide, which were only much later discovered to be in violation of both the
general system of American law, and of fundamental principles of liberty and
equality. At any rate, the very existence of the ECHR makes it impossible to argue
that the system of English law in 1963 had not recognised a prohibition against
inhuman punishments as one of its fundamental rules of natural justice. As a
recent pamphlet by two conservative writers notes:
. . . the Convention was framed by British jurists, working within a common law legal
tradition stretching back past the US Bill of Rights 1791 to encompass our own Bill of
Rights 1689, and the Petition of Right 1628. So it is not surprising that its essential
principles—including the right to fair trial, the right not to be held without charge, and
the right not to be subject to cruel and unusual punishment—are manifestations of the English
common law as it took shape during a centuries-long jostling for power between the
different estates of the realm . . . The ECHR thus marks a vital codification of the common law,
not its repudiation.67
Accordingly, if Ong is to be taken seriously, references to the word ‘law’ in the
Singapore Constitution must be read to imply a prohibition against cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, notwithstanding the lack of an explicit textual
provision.
3 The Requirement of Clear Words
The premise of the first reason for the holding is evidently absurd for one
additional and very obvious reason: if there already was an express constitutional
provision against inhuman punishment, there would be no need to interpret
another constitutional provision to contain one. As a matter of constitutional
interpretation, the Court appears to have misconstrued Lord Nicholls’ statements
in Matthew. The Court interpreted those dicta to emphasise the widely accepted
ability of the legislature to amend the Constitution to remove constitutional
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rights.68 But, by doing so, it modified the requirement that such a thing be done
‘explicitly’: any departure from a fundamental right has to be made clearly and
openly, so that the electorate knows exactly what is being done. The legislature or
the constitutional convention must have the courage of its convictions. Of course,
this principle is neither new nor controversial—we find it being enunciated
throughout the history of the common law, and in cases no less important than
Somerset v Stewart,69 in which Lord Mansfield considered whether slavery was
permitted under English law. He held, famously, that ‘[t]he state of slavery is of
such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons . . . but only
[by] positive law . . . [It is] so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
positive law.’70 As Waldron notes:
Lord Mansfield was not denying that there could be a valid law in England establishing
slavery . . . If Parliament established slavery, then slavery would be the law . . . [but] any
attempt to bring it—or its effects, so far as liberty is concerned—in by the back door . . .
would have to be resisted.71
Lord Mansfield spoke against a constitutional background of parliamentary
sovereignty, and it may be argued that different principles may apply where there
is a written, entrenched Constitution. This however, would be a distinction
without a difference. The sovereign legislature, whose every enactment is an
addition to the Constitution, is presumed in the absence of clear words not to
intend the curtailment of liberties afforded by the common law. There is no reason
why a constitutional convention, which drafts the new Constitution, should not be
subject to the same presumption. As far as the expression of intention is
concerned, there is no reason in principle to think that a constitutional convention
is entitled to a measure of subterfuge not permitted to the sovereign legislature.
Both are lawmakers, and must therefore be forthright. As Lord Hoffmann stated
in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex p Simms:72
The constraints upon [the exercise of legislative power contrary to the Human Rights
Act 1998] by Parliament are ultimately political, not legal. But the principle of legality
means that Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political cost.
Fundamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words. This is because there is too
great a risk that the full implications of their unqualified meaning may have passed
unnoticed in the democratic process. In the absence of express language or necessary
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implication to the contrary, the courts therefore presume that even the most general
words were intended to be subject to the basic rights of the individual.73
The same can be said of the Reid Commission and the Singapore Parliament
regarding the creation and amendment of the Constitution: the limits were and
are purely political.74 That said, the question whether those limits were broached
is a legal one, governed by the same principle of legality expressed in Simms.
Accordingly, if the Reid Commission and the Singaporean government are both
to be found to have drafted the Constitution so as to exclude the protection against
inhuman punishment afforded by the ECHR and by the English common law,
then clear and unambiguous words or actions must be adduced. The Court made
no reference to any such statements, let alone public ones, by the Reid
Commission concerning the removal of that right. Ong still stands: it must be ‘taken
for granted’ that the makers of the Constitution did not intend to curtail any
common law rights against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
However, with respect to the Reid Commission, there is one consideration
which might pose some difficulty. If a statute of the UK Parliament is interpreted,
pursuant to the abovementioned presumption, as not curtailing a common law
liberty, we say that the liberty remains untouched by the statute. The statute and
the common law liberty are two separate things which exist independently of each
other. One does not say that the statute annexes or codifies the common law right.
But that is precisely the argument being made here—that in the absence of words
to the contrary, the Reid Commission must have intended a right against cruel or
inhuman treatment to be included in the new Constitution. It may be argued that
written constitutions intended as the supreme law in their legal systems must have
been drafted extremely carefully, such that if the drafters left out some explicit
textual reference to some right or other thing, they must have meant to do so.
Equally, if they had meant to include the common law right against cruel and
inhuman punishment in the new Constitution, they would have included an
explicit clause in that Constitution. Alternatively, they could have inserted a
general saving clause in providing that all common law liberties not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution are likewise to be afforded constitutional protection
as rights. They did none of these things. This does not mean that the establishment
of the Constitution effectively abolished the common law liberty against cruel
treatment; it only means that it was not given constitutional protection. It remains
a liberty only at common law. And the common law can always be repealed by
statutes, such as the MDA.
It should be obvious that this argument is incompatible with Ong. Leaving aside
this matter of legal precedent, there are a number of problems of principle with
the above argument. If it were correct, we would find that constitutions must go
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into extremely fine detail in enumerating each and every right, among other legal
concepts. Instead, we find that they are expressed at very high levels of abstraction,
leaving scope for interpretation. As a practical matter, such a strict constructionist
method of constitutional drafting would make constitutions brittle, ie mere lists of
rules either unwieldy and unreadable, or entirely devoid of content.75 As Lord
Bingham notes in Reyes, courts interpreting written constitutions should not treat
‘the language of the Constitution as if it were found in a will or a deed or a
charterparty. A generous and purposive interpretation is to be given to constitu -
tional provisions protecting human rights.’76 As a matter of law and of common
sense, there is no reason to think that the drafters of the Constitution, by failing to
make express mention of a right, intended to exclude that right from it.
The special nature of constitutions was the precise reason provided by Lord
Diplock for his rejection of the Public Prosecutor’s submissions in Ong.77
Nevertheless, his dicta appear to leave something unexplained. What precisely is
wrong with a mere attitude towards textual interpretation, however mistaken?
Why should according constitutional protection to only some of the liberties
recognised by the old common law, and not others, make a ‘mockery’ of the whole
idea of the constitutional entrenchment of rights?
We sometimes use the term ‘mockery’ to describe something grossly unfit or
inadequate; an empty shell devoid of substance. Hart identified a ‘minimum core
of morality’ as being an essential criterion of a legal system—if certain rules were
not in place, ‘there would be no point in having any other rules at all.’78 To
illustrate, one could not confidently describe as a ‘system of law’ one which
provided painstakingly detailed rules on conveyancing but left out prohibitions
against murder and theft. One could possibly argue that a system of law which
does not provide for protections against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is
deficient in precisely such a manner. But this seems far-fetched: the uncodified
British constitution did not provide constitutional protections against such
treatment, or any treatment at all, for that matter, but it would be difficult to say
that there was no system of law in the UK.
Alternatively, one could also describe something as a mockery if it tends to
insult. Dworkin argues that the first and most basic duty of a government is to
assume a certain attitude of respect towards those from whom it extracts
allegiance.79 Such respect is arguably not shown when in the constitutional
entrenchment of civil liberties at common law, one of the most important is silently
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omitted. Positive insult is paid when a government repudiates obligations to the
people that were made by its predecessors: Simpson observes that the application
of the ECHR to the colonies was done with the consent of the colonial
governments.80 Of course, it is true that the ECHR operated only at the
international level, and that it had no direct application in the domestic legal
sphere. However, one cannot get around the fact that while the colonial
government was under an obligation to protect an important human right, the
government of the independent republic is under none. The question is essentially
this—what is the average Singaporean to make of the fact that she has fewer rights
as a result of the drafting of the constitutional bill of rights? It is, in every sense of
the word, a ‘mockery.’ Rules of constitutional interpretation should prevent such
an unseemly result. As the late K S Rajah notes:
The provisions of the Articles [2, 3, and 6 ECHR] must in some measure be regarded as
incorporated into Part IV of the Constitution. It could not have been the intention of the
framers of our constitution to diminish the rights which Singaporeans as colonial subjects
were entitled to enjoy, and to lose it on becoming independent citizens of a Republic with
censorial power in their hands after freedom has taken into effect.81
If one accepts the immediately preceding arguments, the Court’s analysis of the
Singaporean government’s reception of the Wee Commission’s recommendation
will also be revealed as clearly flawed: the rejection of the proposed right against
inhuman punishment was not ‘unambiguous.’82 To be sure, it might perhaps be
excessive to require an Act of Parliament in order to justify interpreting a failure
to amend the Constitution as a derogation from fundamental rights, but it is not
good enough to rely upon the government’s omission to mention protections
against inhuman treatment in its reception of the Wee Commission report.83 Such
an omission can be understood in two possible ways: it may mean, as the Court
thinks, that the government opposed the idea of a right against inhuman and
degrading treatment, or, it may be that the government thought an express
provision to that end would be superfluous, since the right was already contained
in another constitutional provision. At a minimum, there should be a clear and
open official statement that a constitutional right against inhuman treatment
would be undesirable; an omission to mention the subject cannot qualify as a good
faith attempt to meet the political consequences of the deprivation of so
fundamental a right.84 Instead, it must be presumed as a matter of law that the
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government was of the opinion that an explicit statement of the right was
unnecessary, and that it was implicit in the right to life contained in art 9(1).85
Curiously, the Court attempts to reassure us that while there is no right against
inhuman punishment, art 9(1) might possibly contain a right against torture86 as a
result of Ong, which it interprets as not ‘justify(ing) all legislation.’ The reasoning the
Court then provides for this is truly breathtaking. The Court essentially argues as
follows: the constitutional amendment proposed by the Wee Commission
contained a prohibition on torture alongside a prohibition against inhuman
punishment. The rejection of that proposal therefore must mean there is no right
against inhuman treatment. However, there may nevertheless be a right against
torture, even though the government was equally silent on that issue in its response
to the Wee Commission’s report. The reasons given by the Court for this bizarre
conclusion were, firstly, that ‘no domestic legislation permits torture’,87 and,
secondly, that in a speech made more than 20 years after the reception of the
report, the Minister for Home Affairs ‘expressed the view that torture is wrong.’88
Accordingly, Executive conduct decades after the constitutional changes
recommended by the Wee Commission is of value in discovering precisely what
was adopted and what was not. If this is the case, it would appear that a speech by
a minister in Parliament deploring inhuman treatment would go some way towards
creating such a constitutional right against inhuman treatment. Conversely, a
statute providing for torture would squash any embryonic right against torture: the
existence of the statute will itself be proof of its constitutionality. In any case, the
Court declined definitively to declare that there was a right against torture, on the
grounds that the issue was not before it. As such, it is still an open question as to
whether there is a right against torture in the Singaporean Constitution, and the
Court’s methods of answering that question appear in danger of being better
described as divination than judicial determination.
4 Mithu v State of Punjab
As mentioned, the Court held that Mithu was not applicable. Certainly, the texts
of art 9(1) of the Singaporean Constitution and art 21 of the Indian Constitution
are slightly different. Whereas the Singaporean Constitution prohibits the 
dep riva tion of life and liberty ‘save in accordance with the law’, art 21 of the
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Indian Constitution provides that ‘No person shall be deprived of his life or liberty
except according to procedure established by law.’ Accordingly, the Court found
three reasons to distinguish Mithu. First, the main issue in Mithu was not about
inhuman ity or cruelty, but about whether life is deprived according to ‘fair, just
and reasonable procedure.’89 Art 9(1) on the other hand requires only that the
depriva tion be in ‘accordance with law’, and although ‘law’ may include
procedural as well as substantive law, there was no requirement that such
procedure be ‘fair, just and reasonable.’90 The Court then noted that Ong did not
enunciate the requirement that law be ‘fair, just and reasonable’, but only that it
meet the apparently different standard of consistency with ‘fundamental principles
of natural justice.’91 The subtlety of the latter distinction in particular has so far
been beyond the poor ability of this author to fathom. The second reason the
Court gave was essentially the same one Lord Diplock offered in Ong, ie that a ban
on the mandatory death penalty would also take down with it other mandatory
punishments, such as fines or minimum or maximum limits on sentences.92 The
Court, anticipating the argument that a mandatory death sentence is qualitatively
different from a minimum fine, says that although this might be the case, the ‘plain
wording of Art 9(1) does not support the conclusion that Parliament cannot make
the death penalty mandatory.’93 As such, the very contention that is being
disputed is raised in its own support. Thirdly, the Court says that Mithu is
understandable only in India’s specific economic, social and cultural context, and
because of India’s unique habit of giving the right to life ‘pride of place in (its)
constitutional framework.’94 The Court then defends this statement with reference
to the fact that the mandatory death penalty has featured in Singapore’s criminal
law throughout its history.95 It was present in the first Penal Code of 187196 (based
on the Indian Penal Code, which also contained such provisions), was applied by
the British even during the period when Singapore was covered by the ECHR,
affirmed by the Privy Council in Ong, and affirmed by the Singapore Court of
Appeal in Nguyen. Again, the very practices and precedents in dispute are used as
arguments in their own support.
D CONCLUSION
The most curious thing about the holding on the status of customary international
law in the Singaporean legal sphere is that it was not necessary to reach the
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judgment. The Court could simply have said, as it eventually did, that there was
insufficient state practice to give rise to such a rule.97 Indeed, apart from the
section on the possible right against torture,98 the judgment seems quite
unblemished by excessive judicial parsimony. We have already considered the
Court’s venturing to speak for the prosecution, and then accepting an argument
that it not only never actually made, but was the exact opposite of the one it did
make. On a number of instances the Court pre-emptively rejects arguments that
the defence never made. For instance, the defence never argued that the right to
life under art 9(1) prohibits the entire death penalty. Nonetheless, the Court offers
that ‘(i)t is not surprising that the Appellant has adopted this stance because Art
9(1) expressly allows a person to be deprived of his life “in accordance with law”;
ie it expressly sanctions the death penalty.’99 A little further on, we see the Court
note in passing that, although Art 2(1) defines the expression ‘law’ to include ‘custom or
usage’ . . . [counsel for the appellant] has not argued that these words are intended to
include CIL. If such an argument had been made, we would have rejected it because, in
our view, the phrase ‘custom or usage’ in Art 2(1) refers to local customs and usages
which (in the words of this provision) ‘[have] the force of law in Singapore’.100
Of course, judicial parsimony alone would not have salvaged the section of the
judgment dealing with inhuman punishments. The intellectual planks behind the
Privy Council’s sanctioning of the mandatory death penalty have eroded steadily
since Ong in a fashion not dissimilar to Lord Diplock’s justifications of other
practices associated with the death penalty.101 A considerable body of juris -
prudence exists to the effect that the mandatory death penalty is inhuman, cruel
and degrading in a way incompatible with a belief in basic human dignity. Apart
from the Caribbean and the Indian cases mentioned above, Stewart J in the US
Supreme Court case of Woodson v North Carolina102 held that mandatory death
sentences ‘treat(ed) all persons convicted of a designated offense not as uniquely
individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be
subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.’103 As such, it was
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necessary to settle the issue of whether or not there was a right against cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Whatever may be said about the reasoning, the practical effect of the judgment
in Yong is to insulate the Constitution from all external stimuli: customary
international legal developments, and even developments in domestic attitudes
towards the infliction of the death penalty which will simply glance off it. For
Singaporean lawyers, the judgment is likely to be a source of confusion, especially
regarding the holding on the effect of customary international law in the domestic
legal sphere. For the Singaporean citizen the most worrying aspect of the
judgment must be its account of what transpired at the Reid Commission, and
how the rights provided by the ECHR were lost upon independence. As against
Singapore’s colonial history under the ECHR, the insulation is total. Certainly,
the colonial authorities in Malaya and Singapore cannot be accused of having
fulfilled their obligations under the ECHR with distinction. Simpson relates how
a notice of derogation from their treaty obligations pursuant to art 15 ECHR104
was filed in Strasbourg in 1954, hardly a year after the ECHR was extended to
those territories, and how the reasons for the declaration of emergency were
communicated to Strasbourg in a cryptic and grudging fashion. Even worse, when
the emergency measures which had necessitated the original derogation were
renewed in 1955, the Colonial Office simply chose not to inform Strasbourg, let
alone file another derogation notice. That said, whereas Singaporeans as colonial
subjects definitely had some rights against inhuman and degrading treatment
under art 3 ECHR which the colonial government was obligated to protect, if only
nominally, the Court makes it clear that as citizens of an independent republic,
they have nothing. For this reason more than any other, Yong represents a mistake
of quite some consequence.
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